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11 Introduction
One of the founding principles of Neoclassical Trade Theory is that free trade improves
welfare under perfect competition, in the absence of externality, and when markets are
complete. Of course, economists have long been aware that this result may fail when any
of those conditions no longer holds. Still, the common wisdom remains that, with enough
policy instruments to correct for domestic distortions, a small economy always bene¯ts
from open borders.
This paper reconsiders this general principle in a framework where asymmetric infor-
mation remains a fundamental obstacle to the correction of domestic distortions. A basic
tenet of the Incentive Regulation literature1 is indeed that e±ciency and redistributive
concerns are deeply linked under asymmetric information. Any regulatory policy aimed
at correcting allocative distortions which could be necessary to enjoy the full the gains
from trade has necessarily strong distributional consequences between those agents who
retain private information and those who remain uninformed. This basic principle of the
Incentives literature stands in sharp contrast with the common wisdom that the absence
of frictions in redistributing gains from trade between winners and losers is a necessary
condition to ensure the optimality of free trade.
With those con°icting insights in mind, this paper traces out the implications of
asymmetric information within domestic markets for the degree of international compet-
itiveness and the choice of specialization faced by a small open country. Embedding the
lessons of the Incentive Regulation literature into a general equilibrium environment, we
derive normative implications of a joint use of trade integration and optimal domestic
regulation on trade patterns. Finally, we ask whether trade openness remains welfare-
improving compared to autarky when asymmetric information is a fundamental obstacle
to the design of e±cient domestic regulations.
More speci¯cally, consider a small open economy with two factors (capital and labor)
and two ¯nal goods. Those goods are traded on international markets and produced by
competitive sectors. In this typical Hecksher-Ohlin environment, one of the ¯nal good
sectors is capital intensive while the other is instead labor intensive. Those sectors also
use some non-tradable intermediate goods which are produced domestically. One may
think of those goods as telecommunications, energy, transportation, utilities and services.
Each of those intermediate sectors is run by a local monopolist which, for simplicity,
uses capital as its sole input. Owners of those monopolies have private information on
their technologies. Insights from the Incentive Regulation literature2 indicate that those
owners may withdraw some information rent from being privately informed. To correct
1La®ont and Tirole (1993) and La®ont and Martimort (2002) for instance.
2La®ont and Tirole (1993) among others.
2therefore for the distortions due to market and informational powers, regulation of those
intermediate sectors is needed. However, any such corrective policy remains by and large
constrained by asymmetric information.3
Patterns of trade. Our ¯rst contribution is to show how asymmetric information in
regulated sectors a®ects this small country's pattern of specialization.
Two e®ects are at play in explaining changes in the pattern of trade.
First, standard Incentives Theory4 teaches us that inducing information revelation
from privately informed ¯rms requires to leave them some costly information rents. More-
over, those rents increase with production in those sectors. Optimal regulation reduces
thus information rents by downsizing production in regulated sectors. Since these sec-
tors use capital only, more capital becomes available for the capital intensive tradable
good. This makes that good relatively cheaper to produce. With asymmetric informa-
tion, everything happens thus as if the small country was relatively richer in the factor
which is informationally sensitive. This ¯rst e®ect may change the pattern of trade with
the rest of the world compared with what arises under complete information.
Second, in a general equilibrium framework, information rents end up being pocketed
by a (representative) consumer and therefore boost demands for ¯nal tradable goods. In
¯ne, under asymmetric information, this consumer enjoys not only his income associated
to the usual factor endowments of this economy but also the equivalent of an \infor-
mational endowment" re°ecting the factor content of the information rents captured by
intermediate sectors. With Cobb-Douglas preferences (and more generally homothetic
preferences), this additional wealth does not change the relative demand for tradable
goods. In such a context, the pattern of trade is entirely dictated by the lower production
cost of the capital intensive good due to the \informationally induced" contraction of
output in the intermediate sectors.
Free trade may be welfare-deteriorating. Our second contribution consists in assess-
ing the normative implications of free trade in this context with asymmetric information.
A priori, there are two possible sources of distortions in our small open economy. First,
monopolies in intermediate sectors might have market power and charge a mark-up. Sec-
ond, asymmetric information might also a®ect the allocation of resources.
The ¯rst distortion could easily be ¯xed under complete information by means of
convenient subsidies. In such a highly hypothetical context, free trade would always
dominate autarky for a small open economy. The conventional wisdom that well-designed
\behind-the-border" policies do no con°ict with free trade would prevail.
3Given that optimal regulation concerns a non-tradable sector, that \behind-the-border" policy is de
facto non-discriminating against foreign ¯rms.
4La®ont and Tirole (1993) and La®ont and Martimort (2002, Chapter 2) for instance.
3Asymmetric information is a more serious concern even when the largest set of regula-
tory policies is available. Asymmetric information is indeed the source of a mark-up that
remains even after policy intervention. Given the dead-weight loss associated to those
distortions, free trade may not always dominate autarky.
When consumers have Cobb-Douglas preferences, we provide conditions under which
free trade dominates autarky even under asymmetric information. However, free trade
can now be sometimes Pareto inferior to autarky. The intuition is quite simple. To
minimize information rents in intermediate sectors, optimal regulation reduces output
in those sectors. If trade openness induces a pattern of specialization which reinforces
this domestic distortion, this additional distortionary e®ect may outweigh the traditional
gains from trade. Free trade is then dominated by autarky.
Literature review. This paper lies at the the intersection of the Trade and Regulation
literatures and borrows insights from both. Starting with Bhagwati (1971), the Trade
literature has built an analytical framework that allows to assess distortions away from
free trade and discuss how such distortions can be corrected.5 Following Bhagwati's
taxonomy, distortions found in the absence of non-pecuniary externalities might arise from
market imperfections or from misguided policy interventions which are exogenously set.
In both cases, well-designed policies could avoid the distortion. Asymmetric information
creates instead a more basic source of distortions which has so far been overlooked in
general equilibrium environments. Incentive compatibility constraints limit the set of
feasible allocations even when the most complete set of policy instruments is available.
Distortions are not a priori imposed by exogenously restricting those instruments as in
the earlier trade literature. They are instead deeply linked to the underlying information
structure.
This last point is in fact closely related to a burgeoning literature that analyzes opti-
mal taxation in open economies (Naiko 1996, Gabaix 1997a and 1997b, Guesnerie 1998
and 2001 and Spector 2001). This literature has investigated also how asymmetric in-
formation imposes limits on domestic redistributive policies. Extending the framework
developed by Stiglitz (1982) to a 2 £ 2 trade model, these papers show that free-trade
can be socially inferior, at least locally, to autarky. In these papers, the demand side of
the economy has private information on the source of factor income (skilled versus un-
skilled labor income) and incentive compatibility constraints a®ect the trade-o® between
consumption and leisure. Our model of optimal regulation investigates instead informa-
tional asymmetries on the production side of the economy. Focusing on the production
side makes welfare analysis much more tractable. On top, it facilitates our derivation of
a constrained First Welfare Theorem: the competitive equilibrium of the economy under
5See Srinavasan (1987) for instance.
4asymmetric information also solves a social planner problem where feasibility constraints
are conveniently modi¯ed to account for informational endowment. No such result was
available in the Taxation literature quoted above. Beyond our speci¯c trade model, our
methodology can be used elsewhere to derive welfare properties of competitive equilibrium
under asymmetric information.
This paper builds also on the Incentive Regulation literature developed by Baron and
Myerson (1982), La®ont and Tirole (1993) and Armstrong and Sappington (2005) among
others. One of its important insight is that, under asymmetric information, there is al-
ways a fundamental trade-o® between giving up to regulated ¯rms some information rents
which are socially costly and reaching allocative e±ciency. Although this literature has
proved to be particularly useful in assessing sectoral interventions, it is cast in a partial
equilibrium framework and nothing is known on the consequences of such sectoral regula-
tions in open economies. This is clearly an important issue given the current globalization
trend and the role that domestic regulated sectors like local transportation, telecommuni-
cations, electricity, utilities and various accounting and ¯nancial services play in shaping
the whole production pattern of countries. In other words, our paper contributes to a
better understanding of how \behind-the-border" regulations a®ect patterns of trade.
Section 2 describes both the domestic and international sides of the economy. Section
3 discusses the benchmark economy under complete information. Section 4 considers an
economy with asymmetric information. It starts with a characterization of the autarkic
equilibrium and goes on by characterizing how patterns of trade with the rest of the world
are a®ected by informational asymmetries. Section 5 considers the normative implications
of openness. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
2 The Model
Our model has two building blocks. The ¯rst one describes trade between a small econ-
omy and the rest of the world. The second one analyzes the design of optimal regulation
for intermediate sectors within that country. On the trade side, we consider a standard
Hecksher-Ohlin model with two tradable goods, manufactures M and agricultural prod-
ucts A, and two factors, labor and capital. On top of these standard features, we add
a continuum of intermediate sectors run by domestic monopolies which use only capital
as an input.6 One can think of those non-tradable inputs as electricity, telecommunica-
tion, transportation and utilities which are produced locally, regulated, and not traded
on international markets. Those examples show that capital (generally under the form of
infrastructures) is the main input for producing those intermediate goods and this aspect
6Given the symmetry of our model, all conclusions are reversed if intermediate sectors use only labor.
5will be a basic point of our modeling.
In those intermediate sectors, production technologies are highly idiosyncratic and
owners of those ¯rms have private information on their technologies. In the short-run,
competition by potential entrants in those sectors is of little value and domestic regulation
is the only device to limit market power. Even though regulators face no restriction in their
choice of instruments to curb market power, such intervention is nevertheless constrained
by their incomplete knowledge of the production technology.
We analyze each building block in turn and we describe the equilibrium under autarky.
Then, we introduce market openness and analyze its role on the pattern of trade.
² Preferences. To simplify the analysis and make it as tractable as possible, consumers
have preferences over consumptions of tradable goods M and A given by a standard
Cobb-Douglas utility function:
U(CM;CA) = ®lnCM + (1 ¡ ®)lnCA where ® 2 (0;1):
² Final Sectors. Final goods M and A are produced by competitive ¯rms. We denote
by p the price of the manufactured good whereas the agricultural good is taken as the
numeraire. Each ¯nal sector uses a continuum of intermediate non-tradable inputs and
production factors. In lines with standard trade factor endowment theory, we assume
that sector M is capital intensive while sector A is labor intensive. More precisely, the
















with ¾ > 1 for i = M;A. The amount
of intermediate good j used in the ¯nal sector i is denoted by xji. The index j varies
continuously on [0;1]. ¾ is the elasticity of substitution between any two intermediate
goods in the production process of good i.
The assumption of a continuum of intermediate sectors is made for tractability only.
Later on, it allows us to use the Law of Large Numbers to simply characterize optimal
regulation in those sectors and to de¯ne an aggregate productivity index that parameter-
izes the whole economy.7 With such a formulation, all non-tradable intermediate inputs
enter symmetrically in the production of the tradable sectors.8
This small economy is endowed with respectively ¹ L units of labor and ¹ K units of
capital. Let r be the rental rate of capital and w the wage.
7A more cumbersome analysis could be done with a ¯nite number of those sectors.
8Breaking this symmetry leads to a more complex analysis without changing the main insights of the
paper.
6We denote tjM and tjA the payments made by the ¯nal sectors to intermediate ones to
obtain the inputs needed in their production processes. Pro¯ts in each ¯nal good sector






























Under asymmetric information, it is a signi¯cant loss of generality to restrict the
payments of the ¯nal sectors to be linear in the quantity of intermediate goods they buy.
Incentives Theory teaches us that menus of options are useful devices to screen informed
parties according to their private information. We discuss below the precise form of those
incentive payments. For the time being, it is only useful to see those payments as being
decided by the regulator in charge of regulating intermediate sectors.
² Intermediate Sectors. Producing xj units of intermediate good j requires µjxj units
of capital.9 The productivity of each intermediate sector j is a®ected by a random shock
µj. Over the whole continuum of sectors, these shocks are independently and identically
distributed on a set fµ; ¹ µg with respective probabilities º and 1 ¡ º. Those probabilities
are common knowledge. Let E
µ
(¢) be the expectation operator w.r.t. µ.
Production shocks in sector j are observed only by ¯rm j's owners. This assumption
is motivated by the fact that the technology for each intermediate sector is highly spe-
ci¯c to that sector and cannot be easily compared with technologies for producing other
intermediate inputs.10
Without regulation, ¯rms in the intermediate sectors would ¯x prices above their
marginal costs. Such market power calls for regulatory policies whose goal is to im-
prove allocative e±ciency by shifting down price closer to marginal costs and increasing
demand of the ¯nal sector for the intermediate goods. However, asymmetric informa-
tion in intermediate sectors still creates important trade-o®s between allocative e±ciency
9Our assumption that services are produced with capital only and that the manufacture and agriculture
sectors use either labor or capital but not both is just made for analytical convenience. What matters
is the relative intensities in these three sectors and, especially in our context, which of the two tradable
sectors uses more intensively the input factor also used in the regulated sectors.
10The reader may ¯nd our representative customer a little bit schizophrenic. On the one hand, as an
owner of the intermediate sectors, he is privately informed on the shocks hitting each of these sectors.
On the other hand, as an owner of the ¯rms in the ¯nal sector and a consumer, he ignores this piece
of information. This modeling di±culty can easily be avoided by considering di®erent classes of owners
knowing di®erent pieces of information but having the same Cobb-Douglas utility function. There would
be as much classes as intermediate sectors. Using Gorman aggregation rule, it is standard to show that
the behavior of those agents can be aggregated and summarized by the behavior of a single representative
agent having the whole the endowment of the economy.
7and extraction of the monopolies' information rents even when an optimal regulation is
designed.
Given the payments received from the ¯nal sectors, pro¯ts in the intermediate sector
j can be written as:
Uj = tjM + tjA ¡ rµj(xjM + xjA); for j 2 [0;1]:
To ensure that ¯rms in the intermediate sectors break-even, the regulatory payments
received by those ¯rms must cover their costs. This yields the condition Uj ¸ 0.
To model a meaningful trade-o® between e±ciency and rent extraction, we follow the
Incentive Regulation literature11 and assume that the regulatory agency in charge with
curbing market power in intermediate sector j maximizes the pro¯ts of the ¯nal sectors
which consume those intermediate goods for their own production process, namely:
W = ¦M + ¦A:
As the sequel will make clear, this regulator takes ¯nal goods prices and factor prices
as given when designing an optimal regulatory scheme. In other words, this means that
the regulator has no tools to in°uence what happens on the ¯nal sector. This ¯ts with
regulatory policies used in practice for electricity, telecommunication or transports where
regulatory agencies have restricted sectoral objectives directly related to the interests of
customers of those regulated sectors (here the tradeable sectors). There is therefore still
signi¯cant scope for markets and prices to equilibrate aggregate supply and demand in
the economy even after regulatory tools have been set up.
Although the regulator maximizes the pro¯t of ¯rms in the ¯nal sector, he does not
introduce any distortion in the relationship with consumers. Instead, his sole concern is
to reduce as much as possible distortions due to the intermediate ¯rms' behavior. Indeed,
under complete information, the regulator would like to ensure that intermediate sectors
charge a price equal to marginal cost so that production decisions in the ¯nal sectors are
not distorted. Because the regulator is only concerned by pro¯ts in the ¯nal sectors, he
wants also to minimize the information rent left to the intermediate sectors. This will
induce some distortions and a wedge between price and marginal cost in the intermediate
sectors.
Expressing pro¯ts in the ¯nal sector as a function of the information rents of the
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This expression stresses the trade-o® faced by the regulator. On the one hand, the
regulator is concerned by an e±cient use of resources, namely ¯nding the vector of in-
puts (K;L;xjM;xjA) which maximizes aggregated pro¯ts in all production sectors (¯rst
bracketed term). On the other hand, the regulator is also interested in minimizing the
information rents left to the intermediate sectors.12;13
3 Trade and Regulation under Complete Information
Let us start with the case of complete information. This will provide a useful benchmark
against which one can assess how asymmetric information might change trade patterns.
² Supply Side. Suppose that the regulator is fully informed on the whole vector of
shocks ~ µ = (µ1;:::;µj;:::) hitting intermediate sectors. Given that there is a continuum





















where xji(µ) is the output of the intermediate goods j for sector i when the productivity
shock hitting this sector is µ. Because of symmetry, all sectors produce the same outputs
in equilibrium when they are hit by similar shocks. Therefore, the index j can be omitted
and we can denote xji(µ) = xi(µ) for any µ. Similarly, we also denote by U(µ) the pro¯t
or information rent of a given intermediate sector when it is hit by shock µ.


























¡wL ¡ rK ¡ rE
µ
(µ(xM(µ) + xA(µ))) ¡ E
µ
(U(µ))
subject to U(µ) ¸ 0; for all µ in fµ; ¹ µg (1)
12Our modeling of the regulator's objective function could nevertheless be extended, at the cost of an
increased complexity, to the case where a positive, but less than one, weight is given to the intermediate
sectors. See Baron and Myerson (1982) for that assumption in a partial equilibrium model. An alternative
interpretation of such assumption is that one cannot ¯nance the informational rents left to managers of
the intermediate sectors through non-distortionary taxation (La®ont and Tirole, 1993).
13With this regulatory objective, everything happens as if the incentive contracts given to the inter-
mediate sectors were actually o®ered by the ¯nal sectors producers in an unregulated framework. This
interpretation of the model gives a broader scope to our analysis.
9where (1) are participation constraints in the intermediate sectors.14
Solving this problem is straightforward. The corresponding solution characterizes the
supply side of this economy when regulation takes place under complete information.
Proposition 1 Under complete information, the optimal regulation of the intermediate
sectors entails the following properties.
² For any realization of the productivity shock, ¯rms in the intermediate sectors get zero
information rent:
U
FI(µ) = 0; for all µ in fµ; ¹ µg:
² Zero-pro¯t conditions in the ¯nal sectors yield
r
¯w














is an aggregate productivity index and ! = w
r is the relative
factor price.
Under complete information, the optimal regulation of the supply side of the economy
maximizes the whole pro¯t of the vertically integrated structure obtained by merging
¯nal and intermediate sectors. Everything happens as if intermediate sectors were selling
their inputs at marginal cost to ¯nal good producers and making zero pro¯t. Because of
constant returns to scale, the whole pro¯t of this integrated structure will also be zero.
Firms in the intermediate sectors produce more when they are hit by a good shock
µ than by a bad shock ¹ µ. Accordingly, we shall refer in the sequel to the e±cient (resp.
ine±cient) ¯rm µ (resp. ¹ µ).
Importantly, (2) de¯nes a downward sloping curve, r = rFI
1 (w) which captures the
zero pro¯t condition on the agricultural sector under constant returns to scale: a higher
wage must be compensated by a lower cost of capital. We will refer to that curve as the
zero pro¯t locus.
The parameter £ re°ects the productivity of this economy. As £ increases, production
of intermediate goods out of capital becomes more di±cult. This decreases the demand
for complementary inputs, capital and labor, emanating from the ¯nal sectors.
14Note again that the prices are taken as given by the regulator since he is only concerned by transac-
tions between the ¯nal and the intermediate sectors. We nevertheless slightly abuse and simplify notations
by omitting the dependence of the optimization variables on the price vector.
10² Demand Side. Given the Cobb-Douglas preferences of the representative consumer,




and CA = (1 ¡ ®)R
FI;
where RFI is the consumer's total income under complete information. With constant
returns to scale in the production sectors, this income comes from the factor endowment
only and RFI = w¹ L + r ¹ K.
² Autarky. Under autarky, the equilibrium conditions on the agricultural and labor
markets yield







where the second equality comes from expressing labor demand in the agricultural sector.















Those market clearing conditions de¯ne thus an upward sloping relationship r =
rFI
2 (w) linking the rental rate of capital and the labor wage: the autarky locus. The
relative factor price ! is inversely proportional to the relative endowment of factors. As
capital becomes more scarce, the rental rate of capital appreciates in relative terms.
An autarky equilibrium is obtained when (2), (3) and (4) hold altogether. Next propo-
sition ensures existence of such an equilibrium and provides useful comparative statics.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique equilibrium under autarky and complete informa-
tion. It is characterized by the price system (pFI;wFI;rFI) solving (2), (3) and (4).
As £ increases, the zero-pro¯t locus rFI
1 (¢) is shifted downwards and the autarky locus
rFI
2 (¢) remains unchanged. There is a downward shift in the factor prices wFI and rFI.
As the productivity index deteriorates (£ increasing), the demand for intermediate
goods decreases and demands for both capital and labor diminish. This leads to a lower
rental rate of capital and lower wages. (See Figure 1.) Since intermediate sectors enter in
the same way in the production technologies of both tradable sectors, the whole impact of
a change in the productivity index comes from a shift in the zero-pro¯t locus (2). When
the productivity index increases, the autarky locus (4) is unchanged and the relative factor







. In the sequel, we will be particularly
interested in the impact of asymmetric information on the productivity index.
² Free Trade. Let us now consider the case where this small country opens up trade
with the rest of the world. Under free trade, the relative price of ¯nal goods is ¯xed on
11the world market at some exogenous level p. Note that (2) and (3) are still valid so that
remaining prices in the open economy are completely de¯ned.

































¹ K = K + E
µ
(µ(xM(µ) + xA(µ))): (8)
Constraint (5) is a trade-balance condition whereas (6), (7) and (8) are standard
feasibility conditions for goods M, A and capital respectively.
From the First Welfare Theorem, V FI(¢) is also the consumer's utility when domestic
markets for input factors are competitive. The solution to (PFI) replicates indeed the
competitive equilibrium. By de¯nition, V FI(¢) is thus minimum at pFI such that the
markets for ¯nal goods are on autarky (i.e., CM = X
¯
MK1¡¯ and CA = X
¯
A¹ L1¡¯) since
indeed imposing those extra conditions corresponds to a more constrained optimization.
Therefore, free trade is always welfare superior.
More formally, let us denote by °(p) the non-negative multiplier of the trade-balance









where the dependence of all variables on the market price p is made explicit. Of course,
that right-hand side is precisely worth 0 at pFI since domestic production is equal to
domestic consumption under autarky. Going into more details and using the speci¯c
Cobb-Douglas preferences, we can easily compute
V



























12Under complete information, one recovers the traditional result that, once domestic
regulation is optimally designed, free trade is always Pareto-superior to autarky.
Patterns of trade. When the world price di®ers from pFI, two cases are possible.
² p > pFI. The world price of manufactures is greater than under autarky. The small
country exports good M which is capital intensive and imports good A which is labor
intensive ¯nal good. An increase in p increases the demand for capital and raises its rental
rate above its autarky level. At the same time, the wage rate decreases to guarantee zero
pro¯t in the ¯nal sectors under constant returns to scale: w < wFI and r > rFI:
² p < pFI. The world price for M is lower than its value under autarky. By symmetry,
we get: w > wFI and r < rFI:

























































































Figure 1: Autarky and free-trade equilibria under complete information.
134 Trade and Regulation under Asymmetric Informa-
tion
Consider now the case of asymmetric information. Owners of ¯rms in the intermediate
sectors are privately informed on the productivity shocks that hit those sectors.
² Supply Side. Productivity shocks in any intermediate sector are not observed by
the regulator. The regulator has to rely on incentive regulation to induce ¯rms in those
sectors to truthfully reveal their productivity parameter.
From the Revelation Principle15 such an incentive scheme stipulates how much each
intermediate sector has to produce as a function of its announcement on its e±ciency
shock. In full generality, and given that production in the ¯nal sectors depend on the
whole vector of input factors produced by intermediate sectors, the transfer tj and the
output xj in sector j should depend on the whole announcement ^ ~ µ made by each sector.
Given that there is a continuum of symmetric intermediate sectors with i.i.d. shocks,
we will use the Law of Large Numbers to approximate the optimal contract by a vector
of incentive contracts for each sector which depends only on the announcement of that
sector. We thus envision a collection of bilateral regulatory contracts for each sector which
take the form ft(^ µ);x(^ µ)g^ µ2fµ;¹ µg where ^ µ is the announced productivity parameter in that
sector, t(^ µ) and x(^ µ) being respectively the payment and the production of that sector.
It is a by-now standard result in the Theory of Incentives16 that, in two types adverse
selection models, the binding incentive constraint at the optimum is that of an e±cient
¯rm µ whereas the binding participation constraint is that of an ine±cient ¯rm ¹ µ. Still,
using symmetry among all sectors, those constraints can be written respectively as
U(µ) ¸ tM(¹ µ) + tA(¹ µ) ¡ rµ
¡
xM(¹ µ) + xA(¹ µ)
¢
= U(¹ µ) + r¢µ
¡




U(¹ µ) ¸ 0: (11)


























¡wL ¡ rK ¡ rE
µ
(µ(xM(µ) + xA(µ))) ¡ E
µ
(U(µ))
subject to (10) and (11).
15Myerson (1982).
16La®ont and Martimort (2002, Chapter 2) for instance.
14Since the last two constraints are binding at the optimum, the agency costs coming
from asymmetric information can be identi¯ed with the positive amount of expected





xM(¹ µ) + xA(¹ µ)
¢
where remember again that those optimization variables depend on the equilibrium price
vector but this dependence has been omitted for notational simplicity.
This expected rent, which is view as an extra cost by the regulator, is proportional to
the production of ine±cient ¯rms in the intermediate sectors. This is where the trade-
o® between allocative e±ciency and distribution bites: the more production is requested
from the intermediate sectors, the more information rent must be left to those sectors.
Inserting this expression of the expected information rent into the regulator's objective
function, one can easily see that everything happens as if the regulator's optimization
problem was the same as under complete information with the only change coming from
the fact that the true productivity parameter ¹ µ is now replaced by a so-called virtual
parameter ~ ¹ µ = ¹ µ + º
1¡º¢µ which is greater. At the same time, the virtual productivity
of the e±cient ¯rm is kept unchanged ~ µ = µ. As a result, we can directly import our
previous results from Proposition 1 to characterize the supply side of this economy.
Proposition 3 Under asymmetric information, the optimal regulation of the intermedi-
ate sectors entails the following properties.
² Firms in the intermediate sectors get a positive information rent if and only if they are




M (¹ µ) + x
AI
A (¹ µ)); and U
AI(µ) = 0:
² (3) still holds whereas (2) is replaced by
r
¯w









is now greater than the full infor-
mation productivity index £.
Under asymmetric information, the regulator wants to reduce the intermediate sectors
¯rms' incentives to report being less e±cient than what they really are. To induce partic-
ipation by the least e±cient ¯rm ¹ µ, the regulator must increase the overall payments from
the ¯nal sectors for the inputs produced by those ¯rms. This increases the incentives of an
e±cient ¯rm to pretend being less e±cient and reap such large payments. If it does so, it
15can produce the same output than an ine±cient ¯rm by using less capital and bene¯tting
from the high price o®ered to the ine±cient ¯rms. Owners of e±cient ¯rms enjoy then a
positive information rent as it can be seen from (10).
Those information rents are perceived as costly by the regulator. However, he can re-
duce that cost by simply requesting less production xM(¹ µ) and xA(¹ µ) than under complete
information values (keeping the rental price of capital as given). That extra distortion
amounts to an implicit tax on ine±cient ¯rms which is formally captured by replacing
¹ µ and £ respectively by their virtual values ~ ¹ µ and ~ £. Because of asymmetric informa-
tion, everything happens as if there were now a wedge between the unit price at which
ine±cient ¯rms in the intermediate sectors can sell their goods and their marginal cost.
Output is ine±ciently low for those ¯rms. Asymmetric information creates a dead-weight
loss in the economy. Moreover, because information rents are proportional to the rental
rate of capital, the dead-weight loss increases with r. This latter e®ect is particularly
important for what follows.
Asymmetric information does not change the overall trend between the rental price
of capital and labor wage. The zero-pro¯t condition for ¯nal sectors (12) still yields a
curve r = rAI
1 (w) which is still downward sloping exactly as under complete information.
However, asymmetric information replaces the productivity index by a greater virtual
productivity index. The curve (12) is shifted downwards below (2). Overall, zero-pro¯t
is obtained at lower prices for capital and labor.
However, this is not the only e®ect of asymmetric information in a general equilibrium
model. Information rents in the intermediate sectors are also redistributed to the repre-
sentative consumer as an owner of those intermediate sectors. That consumer enjoys thus
income °ows not only from the standard capital and labor endowments in this economy
but also from an additional \informational endowment". In other words, the proceeds
of the implicit tax that asymmetric information imposes on the production of ine±cient
¯rms are pocketed by the representative consumer who owns intermediate sectors.
² Demand Side. Under asymmetric information, the total endowment of the represen-
tative consumer can be then written as:
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Using the expressions of the intermediate sectors outputs given in the Appendix (equation
(A10)), we get:
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where ¸ = º¢µ~ ¹ µ¡¾








16Everything happens thus as if, because of his informational endowment, the true
income perceived by the representative customer was now scaled up by a factor 1 +
¹¸
1+¹.
Thanks to Cobb-Douglas preferences, such change in revenue does not a®ect the relative
demand for the two ¯nal goods, it modi¯es only their magnitudes.
For the rest of the paper, we will assume that the following condition holds:
Assumption 1
1





Tedious computations show that this condition is always satis¯ed when ¢µ is small
enough, i.e., when the adverse selection problem is not too signi¯cant. Assumption 1
ensures existence of a a competitive equilibrium as we see below.17
4.1 Autarky
We are now ready to characterize equilibrium prices under autarky. Market clearing









where the second equality comes from expressing labor demand in the agricultural sector.



















When Assumption (1) holds, the market equilibrium equation (15) still de¯nes an
autarky locus under asymmetric information r = rAI
2 (w) which is upward sloping.
However, rAI
2 (¢) is always below rFI
2 (¢). The intuition comes from a careful analysis
of the supply and demand curves on the agricultural market. First, remember that the
representative consumer's income is scaled up under asymmetric information. Therefore,
the demands for both ¯nal goods increase and, given the Cobb-Douglas preferences, they
do so at the same rate. This income e®ect is captured by the scale factor 1 +
¹¸
1+¹ on
the l.h.s. of (15). Second, production on the agricultural market is proportional to labor
wages exactly as under complete information and (up to changes in the equilibrium level of
17Had it not hold, asymmetric information would be incompatible with competitive behavior. We leave
the analysis of this interesting case for further research.
17wages) is unchanged. Hence, equilibrium on the agricultural market can only be obtained
when the rental rate of capital decreases so that the demand boost due to the income e®ect
is compensated by a decreased in income from factor endowments. Assumption 1 ensures
that this relative price adjustment mechanism is strong enough to overcome the income
e®ect due to the existence of (endogenous) information rents. If it were not the case, then
the income e®ect associated to information rents would produce an increased equilibrium
rental rate of capital which in turn would feed back into increased information rents. This
multiplier e®ect would render impossible the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
We can now complete the description of our autarkic equilibrium.
Proposition 4 When Assumption (1) holds, there always exists a unique equilibrium un-
der autarky and asymmetric information. It is characterized by the price system (pAI;wAI;rAI)
that solves (3), (12) and (15).
First, observe that the autarky price of the manufactured good decreases with asym-
metric information. Indeed asymmetric information contracts intermediate sectors which























A priori, it is hard to compare autarky input factor prices under complete and asym-
metric information. On the one hand, the downward shift of the zero-pro¯t locus (12)
due to the deterioration of the productivity index suggests that the equilibrium rental
rate of capital and wage are lower under asymmetric information. On the other hand, the
downward shift of the autarky locus increases the equilibrium wage (see Figure 2 below).
The total impact of asymmetric information on the rental rate of capital ends up being
unambiguous. However, its impact on wages depends on the parameters as shown below.
18Figure 2: Equilibrium under autarky with
and without asymmetric information.
Proposition 5 Under asymmetric information, capital is always cheaper than under
















(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¯)
: (17)
Using Taylor expansions in the limiting case of small degrees of asymmetric information
(i.e., ¢µ small enough), it can be veri¯ed that condition (17) amounts to Assumption 1.
Changes in input prices are thus mostly explained by changes in the productivity index
so that both r and w decreases with asymmetric information.
4.2 Free Trade
Under free trade, p is again ¯xed on the world market at an exogenous value. Following
the same logic as under complete information, the pattern of trade can be immediately
derived and depends on whether p is above or below pAI.
19Proposition 6 Assume that pFI > p > pAI, then under complete information, the small
economy contracts its production of the capital intensive good and expands that of the labor
intensive one whereas it is the reverse under asymmetric information.
Under those circumstances, asymmetric information changes the pattern of trade. To
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That expression highlights that, under asymmetric information, the relative factor en-
dowment
¹ L






With asymmetric information, everything happens thus as if the small country was rel-
atively richer in the factor which is more intensively used by sectors a®ected by agency
problems. Indeed, since these sectors contract their activity, capital is relatively cheaper
and the small country specializes more easily in the capital intensive good. Asymmetric
information induces a specialization bias.18
5 Normative Analysis
The traditional normative conclusions of Trade Theory change under asymmetric infor-
mation. One should not always expect free trade to be necessarily welfare-improving even
for a small open economy that has optimally designed its domestic regulation.
De¯ne ¯rst now the representative consumer's indirect utility function V AI(p) in the





®lnCM + (1 ¡ ®)lnCA
subject to (5), (6), (7) and
º¢µ(xM(¹ µ;p) + xA(¹ µ;p)) + ¹ K = K + E
µ
³
~ µ(xM(µ) + xA(µ))
´
(18)
where xM(¹ µ;p) and xA(¹ µ;p) solve the maximization problem above.
The following proposition holds.
18In our model, capital is the only factor a®ected by asymmetric information issues. More generally,
what matters for trade patterns is the relative factor endowment of the economy, adjusted for the factor
content of information rents.
20Proposition 7 Under asymmetric information, V AI(p) is the representative consumer's
utility function when the world price of manufactured good is p. In other words, the
allocation of resources that solves (PAI) is the market equilibrium under asymmetric in-
formation in the open economy.
Proposition 7 characterizes a constrained First Welfare Theorem under asymmetric
information. It shows that the equilibrium allocation is in fact the solution to a centralized
problem (PAI) provided that the resource constraint for the informationally sensitive
input (18), here capital, is carefully modi¯ed. That modi¯cation encapsulates implicitly
the constraints that asymmetric information imposes in redistributing wealth from the
representative consumer viewed as an informed shareholder of the intermediate sector to
the representative consumer viewed as an uninformed player.
As under complete information, the resource constraint (18) accounts for the cap-
ital endowment ¹ K but it di®ers from (8) on both sides. First, the new extra term
º¢µ(xM(¹ µ;p) + xA(¹ µ;p)) has been added on the resource side. Second, the e±ciency
parameter ¹ µ has been replaced by its virtual value ~ ¹ µ on the right-hand side. The intu-
ition for these modi¯cations is straightforward. Under asymmetric information, virtual
e±ciency parameters are the right concept to evaluate the marginal opportunity cost of
using resources. Hence, any centralized maximization problem that aims at replicating
the behavior of competitive markets for input factors must take into account those vir-
tual e±ciency parameters. Going from e±ciency parameters to their virtual counterparts
amounts to an implicit tax º
1¡º¢µ (counted here in units of capital) on the use of capital
by ine±cient ¯rms of the intermediate sectors. In a general equilibrium environment, the
proceeds of that tax have to be included on the resource side which explains the newly
added term º¢µ(xM(¹ µ;p) + xA(¹ µ;p)) on the left-hand side of (18). Finally, xM(¹ µ;p) and
xA(¹ µ;p) are obtained as ¯xed-points out of the optimization (PAI). This problem is
self-generating in the sense that some of its constraints itself depends on the solution.
Let us again denote by °(p) the non-negative multiplier of the trade-balance condition
(5) and by °(p)r(p) the non-negative multiplier of the feasibility condition (18) at world



















At the autarky price pAI, only the ¯rst bracketed term is zero since domestic produc-
tion is equal to domestic consumption of that manufactured good. Intuitively, moving
away from the autarky price by a small amount has now a ¯rst-order e®ect on welfare
since it changes information rents in the intermediate sectors.
Slightly increasing p above pAI boosts the domestic production of good M. This
raises demand for capital and increases its rental rate which ¯nally decreases production
21by ine±cient ¯rms in intermediate sectors. Starting from the autarky price, opening
borders increases exportation but this also reduces information rents and welfare.
Using the speci¯c Cobb-Douglas preferences, we can go further and easily compute
V




















V AI(¢) is again U-shaped and minimized, as V FI(¢), for pFI which is greater than pAI.
Hence, _ V AI(pAI) < 0. The following proposition follows immediately.
Proposition 8 Under asymmetric information, free trade is welfare-decreasing when
pAI < p < pFI whereas it is welfare-increasing when p < pAI < pFI.
The intuition for this proposition is straightforward. Remember that optimal reg-
ulation contracts the output of the intermediate sectors. If opening borders induces a
specialization which reinforces this domestic distortion, the additional distortionary e®ect
o®sets any gains from trade. A free trade regime is eventually Pareto inferior to autarky.
When p > pAI, the domestic economy has a comparative advantage in the capital
intensive tradable good. Free trade induces specialization in that sector. By increasing the
demand for capital, free trade increases the rental rate of capital and reduces output in the
intermediate good sectors. This specialization exacerbates the initial downward output
distortion of the intermediate sectors due to asymmetric information. This additional
social cost has to be evaluated against the traditional gains from trade in production and
consumption of the Hecksher-Ohlin framework.
When p < pAI, the economy has a comparative advantage in the labor intensive
agricultural good. Free trade induces a specialization in that sector and a reduction of
production of the capital intensive tradable good. This, in turn, expands intermediate
sectors. This expansion mitigates the initial downward output distortion due to asym-
metric information. Opening borders improves the allocation of resources in the economy
and increases welfare. In that case, free trade generates two sources of social gains: the
usual Hecksher-Ohlin gains from trade and the reduced domestic distortions associated
with the existence of information rents. Free trade is better than autarky.
Proposition 8 shows how asymmetric information may dramatically change the stan-
dard positive and normative predictions of trade models. Under complete information,
trade openness allows a better specialization of a small country and optimal regulation
22does not a®ect the pattern of trade. The increase in income of the export sector more
than o®set the loss incurred by the import sector. The utility of the representative con-
sumer increases. All e±ciency gains coming from a better specialization can be passed
onto the representative customer. Of course, this requires that there is no constraint on
redistributing wealth between owners of the tradable good who win from trade openness
and owners of the sector who lose from it.
The key di®erence under asymmetric information comes from the existing endoge-
nous dead-weight loss which makes such redistribution costly. Asymmetric information
creates a wedge between price and marginal cost. Even though, in ¯ne, the representa-
tive consumer pockets both the pro¯ts of ¯nal good sectors and the information rent of
intermediate ones, the total size of this cake is less than under complete information.
6 Conclusion
Standard results from Trade Theory must be modi¯ed when asymmetric information
makes it impossible to fully redistribute gains from trade within the domestic country.
First, free trade even when accompanied by a set of optimally designed domestic reg-
ulations may no longer be welfare-improving even for a small economy. Second, that
country's comparative advantages may be reversed compared to complete information.
The basic reason for this challenge of two of the most familiar insights from the Trade
literature is simple: asymmetric information in intermediate sectors producing key inputs
for tradeable goods introduces distortions that cannot be eliminated even when the largest
set of policy instruments are available to regulate those sectors.
Trade openness improves welfare only when it mitigates distortions induced by asym-
metric information. It worsens welfare otherwise.
Because asymmetric information creates a wedge between prices and marginal costs in
intermediate sectors, its impact on the gains from trade looks, at a rough level, like what
one would obtain if we had instead assumed complete information but left intermediate
sectors unregulated. In that case also, a decrease in the price of the capital intensive good
increases also the price of capital in the small economy. This in turn increases the dead-
weight loss of monopoly pricing and may ¯nally decrease welfare. It should be stressed
that, under complete information, there is no obstacle to implement corrective policies.
Implicit in any such analysis of the distortions associated with monopoly pricing in inter-
mediate sectors under complete information is the idea that the regulator faces exogenous
constraints when choosing his instruments. Our framework with asymmetric information
clearly endogenizes those constraints by giving them informational foundations and makes
23a similar point without any ad hoc restrictions on corrective instruments. This is where
Bhagwati's insight that well-designed policies could avoid distortion de¯nitively fails.
Still on the normative side, it should be clear however that our results could be gener-
alized to the case of partial trade liberalization. Depending on the starting point (positive
trade with initial frictions due to transports costs or the imposition of an import tari®),
further trade integration can be immiserizing.
Our model could also be extended by considering a more symmetric environment
with two countries of similar size, each being a®ected by similar informational problems.
Trade pattern depends then on the virtual factor endowments of those countries and,
in particular, on the respective degrees of asymmetric information that their domestic
regulations face. These factor endowments will have to account for the factor content
of information rents that result from the respective degrees of asymmetric information
that these economies face. Hence, even though countries may look quite similar in their
factor endowments, di®erences in information structures may already be a source of trade.
Following the lessons of our model, one expects countries whose regulated sectors are using
more of a given input factor and which face the most signi¯cant information problem on
these factors to export ¯nal goods using less of it. The intuition built for a small economy
already suggests two aspects of the pattern of trade. First, optimal domestic regulations
may a®ect resources allocation in the foreign country through the induced terms of trade
e®ects. This opens scope for a strategic design of those regulatory policies. Second, free
trade may not be always welfare-improving from the worldwide viewpoint.
By assuming monopolies in the intermediate sectors, we have make stronger the inef-
¯ciency due to asymmetric information. Two possible modi¯cations of our basic model
could make asymmetric information less of a concern and make trade openness more
attractive even though the main results of our analysis would carry over.
The ¯rst one would consist in introducing more competition in the intermediate sec-
tors. Consider thus several ¯rms competing for the right to serve any intermediate market.
This more competitive environment can easily be modeled as an auction between privately
informed competing ¯rms having possibly independently distributed e±ciency parame-
ters. Assuming enough symmetry among competing ¯rms, the optimal regulation would
consist in ¯rst selecting the most e±cient ¯rm in each sector and then o®ering to that
winning ¯rm a regulatory contract close to that used in the monopoly case. The major
di®erence with our set-up comes from the fact that incentives for looking less e±cient are
somewhat reduced by the threat of losing the market even though these incentives remain
present to a large extent. This reduces both ine±ciency due to asymmetric information
and the information rent that owners of the intermediate sectors grasp. Both e®ects go
in the direction of making the asymmetric information model closer to the complete in-
24formation environment but this does not change our major conclusions even though it
a®ects their magnitudes.
Another modi¯cation of our set-up worth to tackle would consist in giving to reg-
ulators a more active role in bridging the informational gap between the industry and
the ¯nal sector. Regulators may gather informative signals on the intermediate sectors.
If regulators use this knowledge to defend the interests of ¯nal sectors, distortions and
information rents in the intermediate sectors will be lower and although the results of the
model would come closer to the complete information environment, we would still keep
the same kind of conclusions than obtained so far. Of course, this access to privileged
information opens also the door to in°uence activities and regulatory capture by the in-
termediate sectors.19 Such extensions may be worth exploring in our general equilibrium
environment.
Finally, one could also depart from our representative consumer assumption to intro-
duce some heterogeneity among factor owners. This would pave the way for a political
economy analysis of trade and regulatory policies in a setting where asymmetric informa-
tion is the source of the stakes that various interest groups may have to resist or to favor
free trade. We plan to work on these issues in the next future.
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Appendix
² Proof of Proposition 1: The optimal regulation is such that all participation con-
straints (1) are binding because rents of intermediate sectors are viewed as costly by the
regulator.
² Consider ¯rst the A sector. Inserting the values so obtained of these rents into the

























for j = M;A.

















































































² Using (A3) and (A4) on the one hand and (A5) and (A6) on the other hand yields the
following expressions of the levels of intermediate goods used in the ¯nal sectors:
x
FI





















² Proof of Proposition 2: Existence and uniqueness follow immediately since r1(¢) is
decreasing with r1(0) = +1, r1(+1) = 0 and r2(¢) is increasing over [0;1[ with r2(0) = 0
and r2(+1) = +1. For the sake of completeness, we compute the equilibrium values of
prices as follows:
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where pFI is given by (9).
27² Proof of Proposition 3: The proof is identical to that of Proposition 1 except that

































for j = M;A.

























² Consumer's income under asymmetric information (equation (14)). Inserting
the values of xAI
M (µ) and xAI
A (µ) obtained from (5) into (13) yields the following expression
for the representative consumer's income under asymmetric information
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where the amount of capital K used in the ¯nal sector satis¯es
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So that we get
¹ L + p
1
1¡¯K =












1¡¾ + (1 ¡ º)¹ µ~ ¹ µ¡¾
´:
28Inserting into (A12) yields
R
AI = w¹ L + r ¹ K +





















1¡¾ + (1 ¡ º)¹ µ~ ¹ µ¡¾
´: (A14)










1¡¯. Inserting into (A14)
and simplifying using the de¯nitions of ¸ and ¹ proposed in the text yields (14).
² Proof of Proposition 4. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2. We have:
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where pAI is given by (16).
² Proof of Proposition 5. Condition (17) follows from comparing (A9) and (A15).
² Proof of Proposition 6. Immediate.
² Proof of Proposition 7. The proof consists in identifying the solution to (PAI) to
the competitive equilibrium. Denote thus by °, ³°, ´°, and r° the respective multipliers
of (5), (6), (7) and (18) where the dependency of these multipliers on p is left implicit.
The Lagrangean for (PAI) can be written as:
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A(p) = r~ µ: (A19)
Those conditions can be readily identi¯ed with behavior on the competitive market.
² Supply side. From (A19) and taking expectations, we get
³ = ´ = r~ £: (A20)
29Inserting the conditions (A20) into the ¯rst equation in (A17) and also in (A18) yields
the same expressions for XM(p) and XA(p) as in (A10) with L = ¹ L when the labor market
is at equilibrium.
Inserting those latter values of XM(p) and XA(p) into (A19) yields the same expressions
for xM(µ;p) and xA(µ;p) as in (A11) with L = ¹ L when the labor market is at equilibrium.
Using the expression of ³ coming from (A20) into (A17) yields




² Demand side. From (A16), we get

































; CA(p) = (1 ¡ ®)R
AI: (A25)
The slackness condition for (18) (taking into account that ° > 0) and (A24) altogether























¡ ¹ K + º¢µ(xM(µ;p) + xA(µ;p))
¢
+ w¹ L:
Because of constant returns to scale in the ¯nal sectors, the two bracketed terms above
are zero which yields
R
AI = r
¡ ¹ K + º¢µ(xM(µ;p) + xA(µ;p))
¢
+ w¹ L: (A26)
Inserting into (A25) gives the expression of demand for tradable goods exactly as in the
competitive equilibrium.
30² Proof of Proposition 8. The proof is straightforward given what is in the main text.
For completeness, we nevertheless check that xM(¹ µ;p)+xA(¹ µ;p) decreases with p so that
_ V AI(pAI) < 0. Tedious computations give us:
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:
31